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PeRCePTIONS OF THe CROATIAN 
DeMOCRATIC UNION IN THe BeLGRADe 
WeeKLY NIN DURING 1990 
Domagoj KNEŽEVIĆ*
The author analyzes perceptions of the Croatian Democratic Union in the 
Belgrade-based weekly newsmagazine NIN during the course of 1990. The 
media in Serbia played a major role in preparing the mood leading up to 
the Serbian aggression against Croatia in 1991. NIN, as one of the most 
influential publications on the Yugoslav media scene, was no exception, so 
its activities during 1990 are relevant.
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Introduction
I commenced the analysis of the texts covered in this work with an issue 
of NIN which featured an alternative scheme for the political parties and as-
sociations in Croatia, published on 17 December 1989, and concluded it with 
the issue dated 28 December 1990. The work is divided into thematic units 
of texts dealing with the Croatian Democratic Union (hereinafter referred to 
by its better-known Croatian acronym HDZ). I examined all issues published 
within the period encompassed by this analysis. I should also note that af-
ter the party’s electoral victory in May of that year, perceptions of the HDZ 
generally became perceptions of the new democratically elected Croatian au-
thorities and the Croatian state in general, and that during the course of this 
analysis I could not find any aspect of the HDZ’s policies treated positively in 
this weekly’s coverage.
* Domagoj Knežević, Croatian Institute of History, Zagreb, Republic of Croatia
D. KNEŽEVIĆ, Perceptions of the croatian Democratic Union in the Belgrade Weekly Nin During 1990
126
The Political Crisis in Yugoslavia and the establishment of Alternative 
Political Organizations
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereinafter: SFRY) endured 
a deep political and economic crisis in the 1980s, which culminated at the 
end of this decade. The Serbian communist leadership headed by Slobodan 
Milošević had deposed the top officials in the Serbian autonomous provinces 
of Vojvodina and Kosovo, and in the Socialist Republic of Montenegro. These 
imposed amendments to the constitution of socialist Serbia in 1989 restricted 
the political autonomy of both Vojvodina and Kosovo, which effectively over-
turned the political structure of communist Yugoslavia as established under 
the Constitution of 1974.1 These changes were pushed through by means of 
the so-called “anti-bureaucratic revolution”, a term coined in Serbia to refer to 
radical Serbian nationalism which expressed itself in mass rallies.2
The Croatian League of Communists stayed on the sidelines during these 
changes. Only the few protest rallies held in the territory of the then Socialist 
Republic of Croatia populated by a significant percentage of Serbs provoked a 
rather half-hearted response.3 These indicators of the political system’s collapse 
led to the appearance of non-communist political groups, their legal registra-
tion, and then the first democratic elections held in Slovenia and Croatia in 
1990.4
These newly-established democratic institutions included the HDZ. The 
first meeting of the HDZ initiative group was held in the premises of the Croa-
tian Association of Writers in Zagreb on 28 February 1989. A preliminary plat-
form consisting of fourteen points was adopted at this meeting.5 This event did 
1 For more on the last decade of the Yugoslav communist state, see Zdenko Radelić, Hrvatska 
u Jugoslaviji 1945.-1991. (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 2006), pp. 489-579. On the dismantling of the 
Yugoslav constitutional framework by the Serbian communist leadership, see more details in 
Borisav Jović, Datum za istoriju: 28 mart. 1989. (Beograd: BIGZ, 1989).
2 For more on these political events and their character, see Olivera Milosavljević, “Antibi-
rokratska revolucija, 1987.-1989.,” Hans-Georg Fleck, Igor Graovac, eds., Dijalog povjesničara 
- istoričara 8, Hans-Georg Fleck, Igor Graovac (Zagreb: Zaklada Friedrich Naumann, 2005), pp. 
319.-337.
3 For more on the politics of the Croatian communists during this period, see Zdenko Duka, 
Račan: Biografija (Zagreb: Profil international, 2005), pp. 38-52; Nikica Barić, Srpska pobuna u 
Hrvatskoj 1990.-1995. (Zagreb: Golden marketing-Tehnička knjiga, 2005), pp. 42-52.
4 On the establishment of alternative associations in Slovenia, see Dimitrij Rupel, Skrivnost 
države: spomini na domače i zunanje zadeve 1989.- 1990. (Ljubljana: Delo Novice, 1992), pp.10-
40; Janez Janša, Premiki: nastajanje in obramba slovenske države 1988.-1992. (Ljubljana: Mladin-
ska knjiga Ljubljana, 1992), pp. 11.-46.; while for Croatia see Z. Radelić, Hrvatska  u Jugoslaviji 
1945.-1991. (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 2006.), pp. 590-591.
5 “Prednacrt programske osnove Hrvatske demokratske zajednice,  28. February 1989.”, photo-
copy of document in author’s possession.
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not go unnoticed in Serbia, and the 12 March 1989 edition of NIN carried an 
article on the establishment of the HDZ under “the leadership of the notorious 
Franjo Tuđman”. The text included the assertion that an “undeservedly” small 
amount of space was accorded to this event, while Tuđman himself was por-
trayed as a “Maspok activist” (a reference to the Croatian national mass move-
ment, masovni pokret, that was brutally suppressed by the communist authori-
ties in 1971) and an “ambitious Croatian national socialist”. The remaining 
members of the initiative to establish the HDZ were also presented, as well 
as basic outlines of their statements, generally characterized as “militant” and 
“open attacks on the system in Yugoslavia”. The foreign press, generally “reac-
tionary and confused”, had “welcomed” the establishment of yet another dem-
ocratic association in Yugoslavia, while Tuđman’s statement that even Serbs 
could be members of the newly-established association prompted the question 
of why Serbs would even want to join such an association. Tuđman’s evocation 
of the teachings of Ante Starčević and Stjepan Radić in his programme was as-
sessed as negative, given that they “suspected” that these were “the greatest and 
most brilliant heroes of the Croatian nation and Croatian history”.6
The HDZ was formally established on 17 June 1989, when the party’s pro-
gramme declaration was also adopted. The party’s first convention was held in 
Zagreb on 24-25 February 1990, at which the delegates adopted positions on 
all vital political issues. The principal positions entailed: the struggle against 
centralization at the federal level, the enactment of constitutional amendments 
exclusively by a freely-elected Croatian Parliament (Sabor), the introduction of 
private property in the economy, a halt to allocation of Croatian revenues for 
the underdeveloped parts of the federal state and the development of Croatia’s 
economic infrastructure. Franjo Tuđman was elected the party’s chairman, 
while the HDZ became the leading alternative to communist policy, which 
was confirmed by its victory in the democratic elections held in spring 1990.7
The Weekly NIN and the Politika News Organization After the 
eighth session of the Central Committee of the Serbian League of 
Communists
The first issue of the weekly newsmagazine Nedjeljnje informativne novine 
(hereinafter NIN) was published in Belgrade on 25 January 1935. It was banned 
after 35 issues were printed, and only resumed publication on 7 January 1951.8 
The weekly was published by the news publishing group Novinska organizacija 
Politika (hereinafter NO Politika), which also published two daily newspaper, 
6 “Vampiri maspoka”, NIN (Belgrade), 12  March 1989, pp. 12-13.
7 Hrvatska demokratska zajednica: 1989.-1998. (Zagreb: Hrvatska demokratska zajednica, 
1998), pp. 13-15.
8 Impressum,  NIN, 17 December 1989, p. 2.
D. KNEŽEVIĆ, Perceptions of the croatian Democratic Union in the Belgrade Weekly Nin During 1990
128
Politika and Politika ekspres. The NO Politika publications exerted a significant 
influence on public opinion in Serbia, and control of this media concern was 
vital to all governments, so in this regard it was under the control of the Com-
munist Party.9 In September 1987, the eighth session of the Central Committee 
of the Serbian League of Communist (hereinafter: CK SKS) was held, at which 
Slobodan Milošević secured his dominance in Serbia, while Milošević’s for-
mer political mentor Ivan Stambolić, as the head of the opposing faction, was 
quickly forced to step down from his posts.10
Not even a month after the CK SKS eighth session, Ivan Stojanović, the 
director of NO Politika, was also dismissed. His ouster was initiated by the 
Socialist Alliance of the Working People (hereinafter SSRN) of Serbia, and he 
was replaced by Živorad Minović, who was until then the editor-in-chief of 
the daily Politika. The official reason for his replacement was his poor per-
formance, but his actual transgression was that he publicly complained that 
the daily newspaper Politika was toeing the line of Serbian nationalism.11 the 
change at NO Politika’s top post opened the way for further staff changes inside 
the media concern involving anyone who had not supported Milošević until 
then. In their interpretation of political events at the time, most of the journal-
ists in NIN’s editorial board preferred the options advocated by Stambolić.12 In 
early November 1987, NIN’s editor-in-chief, Mirko Đekić, whose texts called 
for a lowering of tensions surrounding the Kosovo problem, responded to the 
frequent criticism from the City Committee of the Belgrade League of Com-
munists and the CK SKS prompted by their dissatisfaction with his writing in 
the weekly. Đekić told them that NIN’s journalists do not wish to write under 
orders “as in certain days past”. He was dismissed in November 1987, also at 
the initiative of the Serbian SSRN, with the explanation that his term had ex-
pired.13
The Serbian communist party’s Information Commission held a session 
in early November to deal with the situation in the Serbian press, and it par-
ticularly highlighted the increased level of reporting and a uniformity of views 
on the problems in Kosovo. Its members ascertained that certain publications 
were not objectively reporting and that they were putting forth reactionary 
9 Aleksandar Nenadović, “Politika u nacionalističkoj oluji”, Nebojša Popov, ed., Srpska strana 
rata: trauma i katarza u istorijskom pamćenju, II deo (Belgrade: Samizdat B 92, 2002.), pp. 
151-177.
10 For more on Stambolić’s dismissal, see Ivan Stambolić, Slobodan Inić, Put u bespuće: odgo-
vori Ivana Stambolića na pitanja Slobodana Inića / Ivan Stambolić (Belgrade: Radio B-92, 1995).
11 “Dr. Ivan Stojanović razrešen dužnosti direktora NO Politika”, Politika, 13 October 1987, pp. 
1, 5-7, “Smenjivanje direktora Politike”, NIN, 18 October 1987, pp. 17-19.
12 Slavoljub ĐUKIĆ, Kako se dogodio vođa, borbe za vlast u Srbiji posle Josipa Broza (Bel-
grade: Filip Višnjić 1992), p. 123.
13 “Značenje reči”, 1. November 1987, NIN, pp. 9-10; “Mirko Đekić razriješen dužnosti glavnog 
i odgovornog urednika NIN-a”, NIN,  8. November 1987, p. 8.
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positions. After its session, the Commission released a statement in which it 
stated that some editors in the Serbian media had not been dismissed for polit-
ical reasons, but rather due to incompetence. The Commission’s ultimate con-
clusion was that “whose battle the press propagates is extremely important”.14 
Soon after this session, a new management team for NO Politika was selected. 
Conclusions on the new operating and editorial policies for the coming period 
were adopted, and the most important of these was that deviations would be 
“carefully monitored” through an analysis of texts, while a common policy for 
all NO Politika publications would be established.15
At a session of NIN’s Publishing Advisory Board held on 26 May 1988, the 
weekly’s editorial policy underwent scrutiny, as were the conflicts inside the 
editorial board after the Central Committee’s eighth session. Journalists in the 
editorial board had split into supporters and opponents of Serbia’s new politi-
cal leadership. The Advisory Board concluded that of staff of NIN’s editorial 
board needed to be rejuvenated, and in this regard a constructive debate on 
the weekly’s editorial policy was conducted. A task force inside the Serbian 
party’s Central Committee was also formed to deal with this matter, but it drew 
no conclusions.16 This outcome signified the beginning of the marginalization 
of the remaining journalists in the editorial board who wrote critically about 
Milošević and the direction of his policies.
The changes in the editorial policy soon became evident. In July 1988, an 
extensive interview with Milošević was published. The interview was conduct-
ed by NIN’s editor-in-chief, his deputy and the politics section editor.17 This set 
of journalists conducting the interview with Milošević demonstrated that the 
latter had finally placed this weekly under his complete control. Milošević’s 
political victory made it possible for him to appoint loyalists to the new politi-
cal leadership throughout the system, including the media. Milošević’s under-
standing of the media and his attitude toward them were illustrated by one of 
his closest associates, Borisav Jović:
“For years he dedicated the most attention to the means of disseminating 
information, especially television. He personally selected the chief editors in 
newspapers and news programmes, and particularly the directors of radio and 
television stations. Perhaps nowhere more than in this field did he maintain 
a direct line to all editors who ‘fed’ the public with news, commentary and 
information in general. He was deeply convinced that citizens formed their 
views on political matters based on what is served to them, rather than based 
on their actual financial or political status.”18
14 “Još odlučnije protiv nacionalizma”, Politika, 10 November 1987, pp. 5-7.
15 “Neophodna stabilizacija”, Politika, 13 November 1987, p. 8.
16 “Sednica Izdavačkog saveta NIN-a”, NIN, 5 June 1988, p. 14.
17 “Jugoslavija i socijalizam – istorijske tekovine”, NIN, 3 July 1988, pp. 8-15.
18 Borisav Jović, Knjiga o Miloševiću (Belgrade: Nikola Pašić, 2001), p. 13.
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The HDZ, the Ustasha Movement and Croatian Émigré Communities 
in NIN
The issue cover-dated 17 December 1989 contained a feature from Zagreb 
on the signing of a civic petition. The holding of extraordinary democratic 
elections was one of the petition demands, and the article’s author did not ne-
glect noting that the signature drive was being conducted by illegal parties 
and associations. The article further contained an alternative scheme of po-
litical parties and associations in the Socialist Republic of Croatia. The HDZ 
was classified as a right-wing party which saw Yugoslavia as a federation with 
maximum sovereignty for its constituent republics, or better yet as a confed-
eration. The article went on to note that the Serbian minority in Croatia was 
guaranteed ethnic and civil rights, while the territorial totality of the Croatian 
nation in its historical and natural borders was sought. It was noted that the 
HDZ could be the primary political competitor for the communists in po-
tential democratic elections. The membership of the party was estimated at 
60,000, with a great deal of influence among Croatian émigré communities, 
while in the section dealing with leadership, it was observed that other parties 
had platforms, while the HDZ “had Franjo Tuđman”. It was believed that if the 
HDZ assumed power, it would become “less radical”, while “the greatest threat 
to the party would be the forcing of cult of personality either by hook or by 
crook”.19
The 25 February 1990 issue contained texts dealing with the relationship 
between the HDZ and fascist Independent State of Croatia during World War 
II (hereinafter: NDH). The first text analyzed Croatia’s multiparty scene. Thus, 
it included reports of sources of financing for Croatian political parties, noting 
that “some of these parties, first and foremost Tuđman’s HDZ, are generally re-
ceiving funds from abroad, and even from organizations that are openly Usta-
sha”. It goes on to mention that one of these financiers was “[Ustasha leader 
Ante] Pavelić’s former confidant Srećko Rover”, who was “inextricably tied to 
organized training of Ustasha terrorists in Australia”.20
The 4 March 1990 issue once more contained texts on the HDZ. The first 
was a report on the HDZ’s first convention in Zagreb. Tuđman’s declaration 
about the NDH, interpreted by the assertion that it was “stated openly and un-
ambiguously that the Ustasha NDH is a part of the continuity in the exercise of 
the Croatian historical statehood right” and “that this continuity was not inter-
rupted with the fall of the Ustasha and the NDH”. The arrival of a certain num-
ber of Croatian émigrés to the HDZ’s convention was this time described as 
“not illegal, with arms, coming from some old or new Janko Puszt [a training 
centre for Ustasha émigrés in Hungary during the 1930s – author’s note], by 
rather in a genuine airborne landing by commercial flight”, while the placing 
19 “Sveće i Hrvatska – ponovno Maspok”, NIN, 17 December 1989, pp. 10-14.
20 “Nacional-po(d)mirenje”, NIN, 25 February 1990, pp. 16-17.
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of wreaths at the tomb of Cardinal Stepinac by an HDZ delegation purport-
edly indicated “a new paradigm of behaviour” in Croatia.21 The following text 
included the assessment that Partisan general and historian Franjo Tuđman 
had uttered “the first post-war public defence of the NDH in socialist Yugo-
slavia”. There was also a critique of an observation made by a reporter for the 
Zagreb daily Vjesnik, who said the HDZ convention “simultaneously brought 
euphoria and trepidation, but these are legitimate components of democracy”. 
In this vein, it was suggested to this reporter from Zagreb how even “greater 
trepidation” than that produced by Tuđman could be generated, by “making 
official the ‘Root Orthography’, using this new speech to formulate the ‘Law on 
the Defence of the People and State’ or to rewrite Pavelić’s old law of the same 
content” and by “issuing the ‘Law on the Protection of the Aryan Blood and 
Honour of the Croatian Nation’ or to rewrite Paveić’s old law”. The text closes 
with a question posed to the Zagreb reporter as to whether he was “fond” of 
the HDZ’s political positions, given his “uncritical” stance on this party.22
This is followed by an analysis of Tuđman’s biography. One of his polemics 
from 1969 is cited, with the observation that already “then one could discern 
Tuđman’s view of Ante Pavelić with different eyes”, as well as “Tuđman’s re-
orientation to a new vocabulary predominated by antiquated Croatian words 
which the Ustasha excavated from antiquity”. The text also discusses Tuđman’s 
claims about “the exaggeration of the number of victims of the Jasenovac 
camp” and his stance “on the alleged massacre of captive Ustasha at Bleiburg”.23 
The final text on this topic contained another retrospective on the HDZ gen-
eral convention, with the observation that this gathering, “with its messages 
and symbols, restored the aroma of times past when the Independent State 
of Croatia was being formed”. Thus, there were allegations of “the concern of 
some citizens” over the HDZ convention in Zagreb, so that one citizen asked 
“whether our authorities are aware of how many Ustasha entered Yugoslavia 
for the occasion”, while another asked whether Tuđman was “preparing a re-
prisal of the Frankist struggle to create the NDH with new protagonists and in 
another guise”. The conclusion was that even the Croatian communists “could 
not stand aside” after these outbursts by the HDZ, as evidenced by the warning 
made by Croatian communist leader Ivica Račan that the HDZ was “a party of 
dangerous intentions”.24
The issue published on 11 March 1990 featured a report from the rally of 
Serbs on a mountain called Petrova Gora in Croatia. The view was expressed 
that the call by Yugoslav Army General Pekić to have Tuđman arrested based 
on effective Yugoslav law should not be treated by the Croatian media as “an 
attack by the Serbs on the Croats.” One of the participants in the rally alleged 
21 “HDZ i NDH”, NIN, 4  March 1990, p. 9.
22 “Aplauz u Zagrebu”, NIN, 4 March 1990, p. 12.
23 “Metamorfoze jednog generala”, NIN, 4 March 1990, pp. 13-14.
24 “Stranka opasnih namera”, NIN, 4 March 1990, pp. 14-15.
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that “Franjo Tuđman is restoring Pavelić’s fifty year-old idea on an ethnical-
ly pure Croatia and genocide of the Serbs”, but that “this time Tuđman does 
not, like Pavelić back then, have Hitler and Mussolini backing him”. The text 
concludes with a criticism of the communist authorities, accompanied by the 
question as to whether “it was necessary to wait for the appearance of Franjo 
Tuđman with his hysterical ideas of a fascist troglodyte and indications of a 
new genocide against the remaining Serbs in Croatia”.25 The issue published 
on 15 April 1990 analyzed the Croatian party scene on the eve of democratic 
elections. Tuđman and the HDZ were placed in the “right wing” of Croatian 
politics. The end of the text included a response from certain Croatian com-
munists that Tuđman’s statement about the NDH meant that “the belief in the 
genocidal nature of the Croatian people obtained a new advocate”, so that in 
this regard the ultimate conclusion was that many Croats, “regardless of the 
assessments coming from the HDZ’s central leadership, do not want to ‘poke 
the hornet’s nest’ by voting for the HDZ”.26
The 3 June 1990 issue featured a report from the first ceremonial session 
of the multi-party Parliament in Zagreb, and began with statements from wit-
nesses about the mood in Zagreb on that day. They claimed that “there was 
not even this much adulation when German troops, stepping over flowers, 
marched into Zagreb”. This was followed by a description of the course of the 
ceremonial parliamentary session, the guests in attendance, and the content 
of the letter from Jovan Rašković on the reasons why deputies from the Ser-
bian Democratic Party (SDS) did not attend. The conclusion was that “nothing 
should be expected” from the Croatian opposition because of the HDZ’s abso-
lute parliamentary majority.27
A text published in the issue dated 6 July analyzed the HDZ’s political pri-
orities after their electoral victory. According to the analysis, there was no dis-
puting that after the proposed constitutional amendments Croatia would “lose 
its socialist features”, but it was clear “that the Serbs certainly do not want a flag 
with that coat-of-arms which irresistibly recalls that used by the Ustasha”. The 
piece also announced the preparation of a document by SDS deputies on the 
Serbian casualties of the Ustasha regime in Croatia, which would be sent to the 
United Nations.28
The 3 August 1990 issue contained a text in which it was claimed that any-
one in Croatia questioned only a few months before would have denied “that 
the flag under which the Ustasha perpetrated crimes during World War II 
could have become the official flag of the new Croatia”. The HDZ was criticized 
because under its patronage in Croatia, “everything became national” and that 
25  “Kordun i sabor”, NIN, 11 March 1990, p. 9.
26  “Hoće li Hrvatska udesno ?”, NIN, 15 April 1990, pp. 13-14. 
27  “Dan oslobođenja”, NIN, 3 June 1990, pp. 13-14.
28  “Ruši li HDZ Hrvatsku”, NIN, 6 July 1990., pp.18-20.
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their “idea of national reconciliation of the Croatian people had not thus far 
existed within the borders of the SFRY”. It was also alleged that the HDZ had 
created the view “that during the Second World War a civil war was waged in 
Croatia in which the communists and Serbs toppled the democratic NDH”, 
and that “the Croatian communists also had their vision of Croatia, but the 
conflicts between these visions had led to conflicts within the Croatian nation”. 
Račan’s initiative for a joint visit, together with Tuđman and Rašković, to the 
site of the Ustasha massacre in the town of Glina and then the Partisan killing 
ground at Jazovka was assessed as “theft of the HDZ’s idea of reconciliation”. It 
was claimed that former Partisan movement member Franjo Tuđman did not 
oppose the announced conferral of pensions to Ustasha and Home Guardists, 
because “there is an obligation” to the organizations which financed the HDZ’s 
campaign, in whose premises there were “many photographs of a certain other 
doctor” [a reference to Ante Pavelić, who was a doctor of laws – author’s note].29
In the issue published on 31 August 1990, the topic was the Serbian revolt, 
as well as an analysis of the social and economic problems in this area. In in-
terviews with the local Serbian population, many stated that the Serbs “did not 
benefit much” from the many years of aid to Croatia’s underdeveloped areas. 
The Yugoslav People’s Army was praised for preventing “civil war” by stop-
ping the Croatian police from establishing its constitutional authority. The text 
closed with the conclusion that interethnic hatred would have been less in-
tense had there been among the Croatian people during the post-war period “a 
person who would have begged the Serbs for forgiveness for Ustasha crimes”.30
In the following text in this same issue, the Serbian revolt in Croatia was 
justified as a “normal move” because of the “aggressive intent of Croatia to 
secede from Yugoslavia”. The causes of the revolt were seen also in “the HDZ’s 
constitutional changes and discriminatory provisions, extreme Croatocen-
trism verging on an open Ustashism”, and the policy of “national reconciliation 
of Croats which rehabilitates the NDH and in which the stakes for this recon-
ciliation are the over one million Serbian bodies felled in genocide”. The text 
ended with an statement from SDS chairman Jovan Rašković that with these 
actions the Serbs “have defeated Ustashism and the Ustasha movement”.31
The text published in the 21 September 1990 issue dealt with the problem 
of Ustasha crimes and present-day Croatia. The claim was made that the then 
current HDZ government had “in record time managed to create a situation 
in which its non-Croat inhabitants” have “an abundance of reasons for anxi-
ety and uncertainty”. As an example, the return of the “Ustasha writer” Vinko 
Nikolić is mentioned, and his biography and current positions were analyzed. 
The public was also informed that the journal Response, published by Simon 
29 “Potezi koji ne iznenađuju”, NIN, 3 August 1990, pp. 18-20.
30 “Uža Hrvatska”, NIN, 31 August 1990, pp. 10-16.
31 “Udara nije ni bilo”, NIN, 31 August 1990, p. 17.
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Wiesenthal, published an analysis of Tuđman’s works on Jasenovac, in which 
Tuđman and the HDZ were accused of “reviving the Ustasha ideology and 
minimizing Jewish casualties in the NDH”.32
The link between the HDZ and the NDH was also the topic of texts car-
ried in the 5 October 1990 issue. The first text began with the assertion that 
nobody should be surprised by the “fascistoid brutality and Ustashoid pogrom 
of the Serbian people in Croatia by the Croatian authorities”, and once more 
recalled Tuđman’s statement about the NDH from the HDZ convention. It fur-
ther claimed that after the HDZ’s electoral victory, the Croatian Parliament 
had become a “place of totalitarian policy and revocation of the rights of the 
Serbian people”, while in “Croatia columns of Serbs are fleeing as in 1941”. The 
text ended by calling on all sides to “resolve the problem through referendums 
with all possible demarcations”, because the prevailing state of affairs could 
bring “consequences similar to 1941” for the Serbian people.33
The HDZ, the Roman Catholic Church and the Ustasha Movement 
in NIN
The 1 May issue of the weekly analyzed the attitude of the Vatican and 
the Catholic Church on the HDZ’s electoral victory. The conclusion was that 
“exultation characterized the Vatican’s response to the electoral outcome in 
Croatia”, for the Catholic Church in Croatia provided “logistical support” to 
the HDZ in these elections. The message from Radio Vatican on the Church’s 
assistance to the birth of democracy in Croatia was interpreted as meaning 
that in certain “outbursts of nationalism” the Church had equated itself with 
the HDZ, so that it was uncertain as to who came to whom first, “the cross to 
Tuđman, or Tuđman to the cross”. It was also alleged that many of the faithful, 
at the behest of Cardinal Franjo Kuharić, “forsook” Pope John Paul II’s pastoral 
visit to Bratislava in order to “pay homage” to the HDZ in the elections. These 
events in Croatia were portrayed and assessed as a component of the creation 
of “Catholic conformism” after so many others in the past, among them that of 
the “Habsburgs, and then Hitler’s, Mussolini’s and Stalin’s”.34
The next text on this topic was actually an interview with Simon Wiesen-
thal, conducted in his office in Vienna, which appeared in an issue published 
in October. Wiesenthal explained his views of the NDH. He considered the 
change in the name of Victims of Fascism Square in Zagreb a mistake made 
by the HDZ’s government, and noted that he had sent a telegram to the Croa-
tian authorities protesting the move. He also said his people had disrupted 
32 “Vizental protiv Tuđmana”, NIN, 21 September 1990, pp. 12-14.
33 “Ponovno ustaše”, NIN, 5 October 1990, pp. 8- 9.
34 “Vatikan i izbori u Hrvatskoj”, 6 May 1990, pp. 11.
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Tuđman’s press conference in Washington, DC, while his office was monitoring 
the activities of the new Croatian authorities after Tuđman’s statement on the 
NDH. To the question of “the ties between the Catholic Church and the Usta-
sha movement”, he pointed out the case of the priest Krunoslav Draganović, 
while when asked if he was concerned over “the legitimated appearance of 
Ustasha symbols, Wiesenthal responded that he had already answered this 
with well-grounded arguments in his journal Response.35
A text published in the 12 October issue analyzed the message from Za-
greb Cardinal Franjo Kuharić. He was called out because he had allegedly “ac-
cused the Serbs of preparing to kill Croats”, and this was concluded on the ba-
sis of the cardinal’s message in which he warned about “the forces attempting 
to imperil Croatia’s young democracy”. All of these messages from “the highest 
Croatian clero-nationalist leader”, it was claimed, “benefited” the HDZ, while 
even “darker forces than they themselves” stood behind them. The priest Luka 
Vincetić was praised because he had criticized the HDZ. According to him, the 
HDZ had begun “to exploit church celebrations” to disseminate political mes-
sages, and Vincetić’s statements were the foundation for the assessment of “the 
picture of Croatian clero-nationalism”, which was “a symbiosis of Tuđmanism 
and Kuharićism”.36
The HDZ and the Croatian Serbs in NIN
A report from Baranja was published in the 4 February 1990 issue. The 
individuals interviewed for the report were generally members of the Croatian 
League of Communists of Serbian ethnicity, who commented on the abrupt 
end of the fourteenth Congress of the Yugoslav League of Communists (SKJ). 
Besides these thoughts, those interviewed also made the observation that Ba-
ranja had “always belonged to Vojvodina, but that it was attached to Croatia 
by political decree”. One interlocutor, by vocation a history teacher, claimed 
that political ideas in Croatia “have their roots as far back as the Frankists 
and Ustasha”, and the feature concludes with an announcement of the ar-
rival of “Šeksists” and “Tuđmanists” at the founding assembly of the HDZ in 
Duboševica in Baranja.37 The same issue featured an interview with Zvonimir 
Marković, the head of the Split branch of HDZ. When asked if a Serb could 
be a member of the HDZ, he answered affirmatively, because the HDZ was “a 
broad and democratic” organization.38
35 “Hrvatski kampf ”, NIN, 5 October 1990, pp. 15-17.
36 “Kardinal-huškač”, NIN, 12 October 1990, pp. 16-17.
37 “U Baranji bez Račana”, NIN, 4 February 1990, pp. 16-17; on the discontinued fourteenth 
party congress, see  Jović, Knjiga o Miloševiću, pp. 52-58.
38 “U Evropu posebno”, NIN, 4 February 1990, p. 26.
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A text carried in the 18 February 1990 issue is actually a response from 
HDZ member Šime Đodan from Šibenik. Đodan stated that the “Croatian 
Serbs are essentially Croats from Herzegovina who were converted to Ortho-
doxy by deception”. After this, it was asserted that “this is the last step in the 
evolutionary journey of the Serbian body in Croatia”, and that “the Serbian 
question in Croatia should be considered settled”. Finally he concluded that 
after such statements, “it should not surprise anyone” if “soon demands” for 
Serbian territorial autonomy in Croatia emerge.39
A report from Croatia published in the 29 April 1990 analyzed the results 
of the first round of the multiparty elections. The HDZ’s victory was not sur-
prising, since it was “the most Croatian among the parties” in the elections. 
It was assessed that a major contribution to the HDZ’s victory was made by 
the Croatian communists, whose principal opponent was Milošević and the 
Yugoslav League of Communists Central Committee rather than the HDZ. 
Since the HDZ did not conceal its confederalist, or – as NIN’s reporter called it 
– “separatist” orientation, the future political organization of Yugoslavia came 
into question. All of this led to concern over the fate of the Serbian people, for 
it was claimed that certain “statements by some distinguished representatives 
of the HDZ on this matter give cause for worry”.40
The 20 May 1990 issue featured an extensive interview with Serbian Dem-
ocratic Party leader Jovan Rašković. Rašković believed that the new Croatian 
government formed by the HDZ “could reduce the level of Serbophobia” in 
Croatian society, but that Tuđman had won the elections running on Croat-
ocentrism. In its election campaign, he said, the HDZ “dealt the least” with 
the Serbian political scene and Milošević, but it still trounced the remaining 
Croatian parties which built their campaigns on these issues. According to 
Rašković, this new political reality, meaning the victory of Croatocentrism and 
the HDZ, will “awaken” the Serbian people, even though he noted that the 
HDZ was “not the most rightward Croatian party, but rather the most mili-
tant”. He shared parts of his conversation with Tuđman, as well as his offer 
for the SDS to cooperate with the HDZ in Parliament. He claimed that the 
“SDS hawks are not dangerous” like those of he HDZ, because they “do not 
control the government”. The HDZ’s concept of “the sovereignty of the ma-
jority people” was not a problem for the Serbian people, insofar as the future 
Croatian constitution “validates their sovereignty” in the national body. When 
asked if he had been too lenient toward the HDZ’s policies, he responded that 
“I have even asked myself if my positions had given a pass to the Serbophobia” 
from the HDZ’s ranks. He also deemed that the “plebiscitary” support of the 
Croatian people for the HDZ was an opportunity to build a state in which the 
“Serbian people would be institutionally established”. Tuđman, in his view, had 
“played” with an open hand from the start, and there was “no ideological fog” 
39 “Buđenje srpskih Hrvata”, NIN, 18 February 1990, pp. 20.-21.
40 “Zašto pobjeđuje Tuđman”, NIN, 29 April 1990, pp. 9-11.
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in his positions, so in this regard it was “the responsibility” of the HDZ to grant 
the Serbian people rights and freedoms. He announced to Tuđman a spiritual 
parliament of the Serbs in Croatia, to which he was told that the HDZ does 
not oppose this, and that he was also given support for his initiative to include 
the Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina in this. In the end, Rašković concluded that 
the cultural ties between the Serbian people from the two republics did not 
trouble Tuđman, for they facilitated his political interests concerning Bosnia-
Herzegovina.41
Considerable support for the beginning of the Serbian revolt in Knin was 
expressed in the issue published on 24 August 1990. The Croatian police force 
operating in the area of Benkovac and Obrovac were actually, according to the 
weekly, “special armed units of the HDZ” that had been “successfully thwart-
ed”, while the entire Knin region was preparing to defend itself from “state 
terror”. The text closed with a conservation with an attorney of Croat ethnic-
ity from Zadar who came to Knin to offer “support to the Serbian people” 
in their struggle. He claimed that all Croatian state institutions had become 
“helpmates of the HDZ”, and predicted the outcome of these events by saying 
that “the Serbs hold the situation in their hands, not them. If the HDZ drags 
its feet in resolving the Serbian question, the Serbs will raise an uprising and 
the army will have to take control”.42 This issue also featured an interview with 
Serbian historian Vasilije Krestić. He provided a chronology of the Serbian 
people’s history in Croatia from the end of the nineteenth century. He charac-
terized the HDZ’s policies as “retrograde”, because it had returned to “Frankist 
postulates”. He also warned the Croatian leadership to “refrain from carelessly 
playing with a fire that may burn them”, and that this path to potential war will 
involve “all Serbs, regardless of their ideological or party preferences”.43
The 14 September 1990 issue contained an interview with Milan Babić, 
the chairman of the Municipal Assembly of Knin and a member of the top 
leadership of the SDS. He shared certain details from a meeting with Croatian 
officials Josip Boljkovac and Slavko Degoricija held in Donji Lapac. Babić 
claimed that the HDZ was “not concealing” its intent to remove Croatia from 
Yugoslavia. He added that the SDS was also not concealing its own intentions, 
as it demanded “cultural autonomy” for the Serbs if the federation remained 
intact, and “territorial autonomy with the right to self-determination” in case 
of formation of a confederation or the break-up of Yugoslavia. He believed that 
“most Croats still support Yugoslavia” and that the then upcoming referendum 
in Croatia should demonstrate this, while stressing in particular that the Serbs 
in Croatia were “never a minority and never will be”. When informed that 
41 “Srbi i hrvatski plebisciti”, NIN, 20 May 1990, pp. 16-20.
42 “Glasine i glasanje”, NIN, 24 August 1990, pp. 10-12.
43 “Retrogradnost hrvatske zvanične politike”, NIN, 24 August 1990, pp. 14-16.
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the Croatian draft treaty for a confederal Yugoslavia had been completed, he 
responded that “Serbian autonomy in Croatia is also a fait accompli”.44
A text published in the 29 October 1990 issue contained an analysis of 
the changes in the Croatian media after the establishment of the HDZ’s gov-
ernment. The resignation of the editor-in-chief of the news desk at Zagreb 
Television was noted, with the observation that she had not “left voluntarily”, 
and that none of the other chief editors in this television station’s other depart-
ments would leave “voluntarily” either. According to this analysis, not even 
the director general of TV Zagreb, Veljko Knežević, could remain at his post, 
as he was dismissed for being a “Serb and a communist”, while the push for his 
replacement was led by Antun Vrdoljak, a member of Croatia’s then still collec-
tive presidency. The conclusion of this analysis was that “the HDZ’s dismissal 
of these journalists is incomprehensible”, since the party received their “enor-
mous logistical support” during the election campaign. The reporters working 
at TV Zagreb were also criticized fro “creating an anti-Serb mood” in their 
reporting during the preceding years from the rallies of the so-called “anti-
bureaucratic revolution”, and that they should not be “surprised” now because 
they were “responsible for the HDZ’s political success”. The article further not-
ed the dismissal of the editor-in-chief of the daily newspaper Vjesnik, also an 
ethnic Serb, and that he had allegedly been dismissed while hospitalized. The 
text ended with a reminder that in his campaign, Tuđman extolled press free-
dom as one of the fundamental tenets of a democratic society, but recalled that 
this had also been asserted by Oliver Cromwell and Lenin, who very quickly 
“introduced censorship of the press after assuming power”.45
A text carried in the 20 December 1990 examined the Croatian political 
situation on the eve of enactment of the new democratic Constitution. Croa-
tia’s new territorial organization was outlined, with the observation that the 
main problem confronting Croatia’s constitution-writers was the “possible 
creation” of an autonomous district called Krajina, which could “grow” into a 
federal unit of Yugoslavia after a time. The charter of the autonomous district 
was presented to the public by Babić, and he announced the formal ratification 
of this document prior to the promulgation of the Croatian constitution. This 
document foresaw the unification of this district and municipalities in Bosnia-
Herzegovina with majority Serb populations in case of disintegration of Yugo-
slavia. The text concluded that Babić and Rašković “share the same vision of 
the right” to self-determination as Tuđman and Veselica, but that the Croatian 
duo “negates the rights of the Serbian people in Croatia”.46
44 “Red poteza u cajtnotu”, NIN, 14 September 1990, 16; for similar views, see “Nećemo da 
budemo naivni”, NIN, 5 October 1990, pp. 10-13.
45 “Šahiranje novinarske udružbe”, NIN, 29 June 1990, pp. 16-17.
46  “Povratak Krajine”, NIN, 20 December 1990, pp. 12-14.
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A text published in the 28 December 1990 issue carried reporting on the 
enactment of the new Croatian constitution. It was noted that the new Croa-
tian constitution had been promulgated on 22 December, on Yugoslav People’s 
Army Day, and that Tuđman stated that the new constitution may serve as an 
example to many European constitution-writers. The text also stressed that the 
new constitution had “relegated the Croatian Serbs to minority status”, while 
the official language became Croatia, and Cyrillic was only an official second 
script in certain parts of Croatia. It was also noted that MPs of Serb ethnic-
ity from the Croatian League of Communists/Party of Democratic Change 
(SKH-SDP) had attempted at the beginning to influence some changes that 
they believed would have been in everybody’s interest, but that an address by 
their member Sime Rajić, apparently proclaimed “a handy Serb”, was met with 
catcalls. One of the ethnic Serb members of the SKH-SDP “complained” that 
he did not want to stay for promulgation of the constitution, but that he “re-
mained due to concern” over his job. When asked why Croatia did not pro-
claim its independence immediately, Tuđman responded that a negative re-
sponse to this move by the Serbs in Croatia and a majority in the Yugoslav 
People’s Army was possible. The report continued by noting that a day earlier 
the Serbian Autonomous District of Krajina (best known as ‘SAO Krajina’) had 
been proclaimed in Knin, while the Yugoslav and Serbian flags were raised on 
the Knin fortress. The text ended with the assertion that “even Tuđman, the 
most reasonable among Croatian politicians, is still not aware that Croatia has 
forever lost the territories, municipalities in which the Serbs form the majority 
of the population”.47
This same issue featured an open letter from Jovan Rašković that the Za-
greb-based weekly Danas had earlier refused to print. The letter contained an 
interpretation of Croatian-Serbian relations going back 160 years, with partic-
ular emphasis on the ideology of Ante Starčević. He listed the Ustasha crimes 
which Croatian historians had “attempted to minimize”, and which Croatian 
intellectuals had “never condemned”. According to Rašković, Tuđman was a 
“minor, unknown historian” whose “primary preoccupation” was to reduce the 
number of Serbian casualties. The Croatian Parliament, like all other Croa-
tian institutions, was “a place of tyranny against the Serbian people”, while the 
Croatian Serbs were “exposed to aggression as no other people in Europe”. He 
denied that Serbia and Milošević had anything to do with the “Serbian resis-
tance” in Croatia, while the Croatian Serbs were not “pleased with the attitude” 
of the new Croatian authorities toward Yugoslavia, but that they were open to 
negotiations with “fulfilment of the Serbian people’s demand for autonomy”.48
47 “Jesmo li ga donijeli ?”, NIN, 28 December 1990, pp. 11-13.
48 “Šta Danas ne sme da objavi”, NIN, 28 December 1990, pp. 28-29.
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The HDZ and vuk Drašković as a Representative of the Serbian 
Opposition in NIN
The 21 January 1990 issue contained an analysis of the HDZ assembly in 
Split. The speakers there stressed that Yugoslavia as it then existed was useless 
to everyone, so that the question arose as to “how and when the Yugoslav state 
in Croatia became an unresolved South Slav question”. Some of the HDZ’s de-
mands were characterised as “similar to the political proclamations” of Serbian 
opposition politician Vuk Drašković.49 The 4 February 1990 issue featured an 
interview with Zvonimir Marković, the chairman of the HDZ’s Split branch. 
When asked on the comparison between the HDZ and Vuk Drašković’s politi-
cal platform, he responded that he did “not see anywhere” any similarities, nor 
did he agree with the claim that if “there were no Tuđman on one side and 
Drašković on the other, the country would be at peace”.50
An interview with Borislav Mikelić, the chairman of the Gravrilović meat-
packing company’s operating board and a member of the Central Committee 
of the Yugoslav League of Communists, was published in the 18 March 1990. 
Mikelić claimed that the crisis in the communist system over many years had 
created the conditions of the processes under way at the time. Thus, he said that 
“Tuđman, Šeks, Đodan and others most clearly [...] illustrate these processes. 
Their admiration of the Quisling NDH, without any repercussions, throws a 
shadow of doubt on judicial organs as well, above all the public prosecution”. 
When asked about the fact that Serbia banned the work of Drašković’s Serbian 
Renewal Movement (SNO), while Croatia did not do the same for the HDZ, he 
responded that was “an adherent of policies that would have various Tuđmans 
and Draškovićs eliminated as any other creators on the political scene”, be-
cause he claimed that the “demolition of Yugoslavia also implies the demoli-
tion of Croatia, rather than its expansion as Tuđman believes”. He assessed the 
prospect of the HDZ’s victory in the elections as “a catastrophe for Croatia, and 
even for them, because they would not be able to remain in power”.51
The 2 November 1990 issue considered Drašković’s visit to Jasenovac, and 
the question was posed as to how he obtained “permission from the Croatian 
authorities”. His arrival followed on the heels of the prohibition of a similar 
visit by Radovan Karadžić, the head of the SDS in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 
Serbian writer Brane Crnčević. The first conclusion was that the Croatian au-
thorities had altered their strategy, for it had introduced a logic proclaimed 
“retreating to victory” applied in the territory of the Knin region. The second 
conclusion was that Drašković had “received the logistical aid of the HDZ” as 
Milošević’s primary political opponent in Serbia, because they believed that 
49 “Tuđman i samopredjeljenje”, NIN, 21 January 1990, pp. 10-11.
50  “U Evropu posebno”, NIN, 4 February 1990, p. 26.
51  “Gore od maspoka”, NIN, 18 March 1990, pp. 12-15.
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it would be “easier to deal with the Serbian Renewal Movement than with the 
socialists of Serbia”. The text closed with a part of Drašković’s speech in which 
he “included Catholic brothers as victims at Jasenovac”, and this was pointed 
out as a possible motive for allowing Drašković’s visit.52
Conclusion
The most frequent perception of the HDZ in the texts carried in NIN dur-
ing 1990 were as a party associated with the Ustasha movement and Croatian 
political émigrés, so that after its victory in elections the very state in which 
it rose to power became the restored “Ustasha Independent State of Croatia”. 
All of this was tied to the perception of the involvement of the Roman Catho-
lic Church as an organization which upheld a party linked to the “Ustasha 
movement”, and which was “renewing a new Ustasha state”. All of this was 
reflected in relations between the HDZ and the Croatian Serbs, who had to 
be “defended” from this “new threat and policy” conducted by the HDZ. This 
was followed by the perception of the HDZ as the “wrecker” of Yugoslavia, so 
that its policies were compared to those of the Serbian opposition leader Vuk 
Drašković, which was also in the interest of the Serbian communist authorities 
of the time, as elections in Serbia were approaching. During the analysis of 
these texts, I did not come across any aspect of the HDZ’s policies that received 
positive treatment in this weekly, so that I concluded that the weekly engaged 
in an unobjective and uncritical campaign against the HDZ. This fact is not 
surprising, since at that time the management bodies of this weekly were un-
der the complete control of the Serbian authorities, whose interests from both 
the ideological and national standpoint were diametrically opposed to the 
HDZ’s political objectives. This media campaign in NIN contributed signifi-
cantly to the creation of the atmosphere for the beginning of the revolt of the 
Croatian Serbs, and the subsequent aggression against Croatia. This method-
ology of portraying any aspect of Croatian politics or components of Croatian 
society advocating Croatian interests as linked to the Ustasha movement has a 
long tradition in the Yugoslav communist state, so that the strategy of creating 
perceptions of the HDZ in this weekly should be viewed in this light. It should 
be noted that this strategy had a counterproductive aspect, for the campaign 
waged by the Serbian media, which included this weekly, contributed to the 
strengthening of the HDZ on the Croatian political scene, which was borne 
out by further political events in Croatia.
52  “Tuđman i Drašković”, NIN, 2 November 1990, p. 20.
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Die Perzeption der Kroatischen demokratischen Gemeinschaft in 
Belgrader Wochenzeitschrift NIN in 1990 
Zusammenfassung
Der Autor analysiert die Perzeption der Kroatischen demokratischen Ge-
meinschaft (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica, HDZ) in Belgrader Wochen-
zeitschrift NIN im Jahre 1990. Medien in Serbien übten eine bedeutende Rolle 
in Vorbereitung der geistigen Atmosphäre in serbischer Öffentlichkeit vor ser-
bischem Angriff auf Kroatien in 1991 aus. Keine Ausnahme in dieser Hinsicht 
stellte auch die Belgrader Wochenzeitschrift NIN dar, als ein der bedeutendsten 
Druckwerke auf der Medienszene Jugoslawiens. Diese Zeitschrift führte eine 
unobjektive und unkritische Campagne gegen die HDZ. Diese Partei wurde 
auf den Seiten dieser Zeitschrift als Nachfolger von Ustascha-Bewegung und 
Kroatien mit HDZ an der Macht als eine Wiederherstellung des „Unabhän-
gigen Staates Kroatien“ repräsentiert. Das soll nicht bewundern, weil damals 
die NIN-Leitungsbehörden von der serbischen politischen Elite kontrolliert 
wurden, derer politische Interessen in ideologischer und nationaler Hinsicht 
denen von HDZ genau entgegengesetzt waren. Solche Darstellung aller Aspe-
kte kroatischer Politik oder Gesellschaft, die kroatische Interessen befürwor-
teten, als Neigung zur Ustascha-Bewegung, hatte eine lange Tradition im jugo-
slawischen kommunistischen Staate. Die Gestaltung der Perzeption von HDZ 
in der Zeitschrift NIN soll auch in diesem Sinne interpretiert werden. Diese 
von serbischen Medien geführte Campagne wirkte aber kontraproduktiv, weil 
sie zur Stärkung der HDZ auf der kroatischen politischen Szene beitrug.
